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Summary: If there is a conﬂ ict between a provision of national law 
and a directly effective provision of EC law, administrative authorities 
are obliged to set aside national law if consistent interpretation of the 
latter is not possible, and eventually to apply directly effective provi-
sions of Community law instead. This obligation, which the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has clearly formulated for both primary EC law 
and secondary legislation, is hereinafter for reasons of convenience 
referred to as the ‘Costanzo obligation’. Although this obligation may 
seem entirely clear cut and explicable from a European perspective, 
problems may occur from the point of view of national constitutional 
and administrative law. In this paper, the effect of the ‘Costanzo obli-
gation’ with regard to the principle of legality in Germany, France and 
the Netherlands is discussed.
    
1. Introduction
A great amount of the European Court of Justice case law is devoted 
to the obligations and powers of national courts.1 National administrative 
authorities, however, have also been given their own independent obliga-
tions under EC law. These obligations are rather under-researched, but 
their importance cannot be underestimated, as the application of Com-
munity law primarily takes place in administrative decisions, of which 
only a very low number ends up in court proceedings. Hence, the effec-
tiveness of Community law in practice largely depends on its application 
by administrative authorities. 
The Court of Justice has established an important obligation for 
national administrative authorities for cases in which a conﬂ ict arises 
between provisions of national law and provisions of EC law. In brief, if 
there is a conﬂ ict between a provision of national law and a directly effec-
tive provision of EC law, all administrative authorities are obliged to set 
* Europa Institute, Utrecht University. The author would like to thank Prof Sacha Prechal 
and Prof Rob Widdershoven for their valuable comments.
1  See very extensively on this topic M Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2006).
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aside the provision of national law if consistent interpretation of the latter 
is not possible, and eventually to apply the directly effective provisions of 
Community law instead.2 Hence, when a provision of national law is, for 
instance, incompatible with the freedom of establishment, national ad-
ministrative authorities are no longer allowed to apply the national provi-
sion concerned. This obligation to disapply national law, which the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) has clearly formulated for both primary EC 
law3 and secondary legislation,4 is hereinafter for reasons of convenience 
referred to as the ‘Costanzo obligation’. The obligation may seem entirely 
clear cut and explicable from a European perspective, as it follows from 
the principle of primacy of Community law. In other words, it guarantees 
the effective and uniform application of Community law by obliging ad-
ministrative authorities in very general terms to set aside all conﬂ icting 
rules of national law. Nevertheless, problems may occur from the point of 
view of national constitutional and administrative law. 
In this article, the effect of the ‘Costanzo obligation’ with regard to 
the principle of legality is discussed. In subsection 2, the development 
of the ‘Costanzo obligation’ in Luxembourg case law is discussed. Then, 
the focus is shifted to the tension this obligation causes with regard to 
the principle of legality in the national legal orders of the Member States. 
Since it is hardly possible to discuss this topic in general terms for all 
Member States, this article focuses on France, Germany and the Neth-
erlands as examples. Subsection 3 brieﬂ y discusses the contents of the 
principle of legality in these three Member States. Two main dimensions 
can be distinguished within this principle: the precedence of statutory 
law and the requirement of a statutory basis. These elements are dis-
cussed respectively in subsections 4 and 5, both also including the con-
sequences of the ‘Costanzo obligation’. Finally, subsection 6 provides 
some concluding observations. 
In general, it should be stated that the aim here is to pay equal at-
tention to the situation in the three Member States concerned, although 
this may sometimes not be possible when a topic is far more ﬁ ercely de-
bated in one of the countries. Moreover, it should be emphasised that the 
problems encountered in the three chosen legal systems are not always 
comparable. As different legal systems organise power differently, the re-
lationship between different branches of government differs. Therefore, 
2  See for example Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839; Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] 
ECR I-2517 and Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) [2003] ECR I-8055.
3  Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) [2003] ECR I-8055.
4  For the instrument of the regulation, this obligation can be derived from its nature and 
character as laid down in art 249 EC; for the directly effective provisions of directives that 
have not been correctly implemented in good time, this was decided in the Fratelli Costanzo 
case.
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both the problems that national administrations encounter, and likewise, 
the solutions to those problems under domestic constitutional law, will 
differ. Often the German doctrine is discussed a little more extensively, 
since it pays considerable attention not only to the principle of legality, 
but also to the ‘Costanzo obligation’. 
2. The ‘Costanzo obligation’ in the case law of the Court of Justice
Administrative authorities can come across incompatibilities be-
tween the provisions of national law and the provisions of EC law in 
different situations. In this regard, the literature often distinguishes indi-
rect collisions and direct collisions.5 
Indirect collisions concern cases in which EC law provides substan-
tive rules on the case concerned, whereas the application of these rules 
depends on national procedural law, which may limit the effects of the 
substantive provisions of EC law. In such cases, the provisions of na-
tional law at stake are examined in the light of the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness, which have been developed in the case law of the 
ECJ, and which provide respectively that the rules that are applied on 
actions in which EC law is involved cannot be less favourable than those 
relating to similar actions not involving an EC law component, and that 
national procedural rules may not render the exercise of rights conferred 
by Community law virtually impossible or excessively difﬁ cult. When the 
assessment of national law in the light of these principles does not lead to 
a solution, for instance because the powers of the national administrative 
authority under national procedural law are very limited or even absent, 
the so-called ‘procedural rule of reason’ test applies. This test assesses 
whether the reduction of the effectiveness of EC law can be justiﬁ ed by 
the principles which underlie national procedural law. This does not au-
tomatically lead to the setting aside of the national procedural law, as 
for example the Kühne & Heitz case shows: only under speciﬁ c circum-
stances are administrative authorities obliged to review administrative 
decisions which are contrary to EC law.6
A direct collision exists when a provision of national law conﬂ icts 
with a provision of EC law, and when the two cannot be applied simul-
taneously because that would lead to incompatible legal consequences. 
This is often the case when both provisions have a substantive character. 
In such cases, administrative authorities have different options to resolve 
the conﬂ ict. All options follow from the principles of direct effect, primacy 
5  M Niedobitek, ‘Kollisionen zwischen EG-Recht und nationalem Recht’ (2001) Verwal-
tungsarchiv 58.
6  Case C-453-00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837.
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and consistent interpretation. The precise function and role of each of 
these principles can be explained in the light of the ‘three step model’ as 
developed by Prechal.7 Although this model was primarily developed for 
national courts, it can be applied on national administrative authorities 
as well. 
The ﬁ rst step is that administrative authorities are primarily obliged 
to apply EC law. This obligation is inherent in the principle of direct ef-
fect, which implies in the ﬁ rst place that administrative authorities have 
to assess whether a conﬂ ict exists between such a norm and the pro-
visions of national law. Hence, the provision of EC law functions as a 
standard of review for national law. 
If a conﬂ ict exists, two options are available as a second step. In the 
ﬁ rst place, the conﬂ ict can be solved by the consistent interpretation of 
the national law provisions concerned. This ‘obligation to interpret’ is 
based on the loyalty obligation of Article 10 EC and is even regarded as 
‘inherent in the system of the Treaty’.8 The obligation as such is limited 
by the principle of legal certainty and cannot for example lead to contra 
legem interpretation.9 Consistent interpretation may be an attractive op-
tion, since an outright choice for one of the conﬂ icting rules can then 
be avoided. Nevertheless, it may also have big consequences, and might 
come in practice pretty close to the rewriting of domestic law. Compare 
for example the ATM case of the Dutch Council of State,10 in which a 
Dutch statute only allowed the prohibition of the export of waste if it 
jeopardised the implementation of plans and programmes prepared by 
the Dutch environment minister for the disposal of hazardous waste. Di-
rective 84/361, however, only permitted an export ban if this ‘would ad-
versely affect the implementation of a plan prepared pursuant to Article 
12 of Directive 78/319 or Article 6 of Directive 76/403’. The Council then 
compared the two provisions and concluded that that Dutch legislation 
was drafted too broadly. Therefore, it interpreted the domestic legislation 
in the light of the Directive provision, thus de facto redrafting it. 
The other option to solve the conﬂ ict, particularly when consistent 
interpretation cannot resolve the apparent incompatibility, is the disap-
plication of the conﬂ icting provisions of national law. This obligation fol-
lows from the principle of the primacy of EC law. It follows from cases 
7  S Prechal, ‘Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the 
European Union’ in C Barnard (ed) The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the 
Impact of the Constitutional Debate (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007).
8  Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835.
9  Compare for instance Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis ECR 3969, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] 
ECR I-5285 and Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705.
10  Dutch Council of State 15 December 1994 AB 1996 29.
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such as Fratelli Costanzo,11 CIF12 and Ciola13 that administrative authori-
ties are obliged to do so if consistent interpretation does not lead to a 
solution. This does not necessarily mean that the provision concerned 
is rendered invalid or null and void - in the sense of the German term 
Geltungsvorrang - since it may be lawfully applied in other cases. Its ap-
plication is only excluded in the case concerned. However, this obligation 
is unequivocal and uncompromising:14 all national legislation has to be 
reviewed in the light of EC law, regardless of the nature of the national 
rule in question. Moreover, the obligation applies to all administrative 
authorities, from ministers to decentralised bodies. 
When disapplication of a provision of national law is required, one 
has to bear in mind that the principle of primacy is a negative rule of 
instruction: it only implies that certain rules of national law cannot be 
applied in a speciﬁ c case. In some cases, solely setting aside national law 
may be enough to solve the conﬂ ict, for example when EC law is relied 
upon by means of an exception of illegality in administrative proceedings, 
or when national criminal law provisions which deﬁ ne a criminal offence 
are inapplicable, or, for instance, when the disapplication may imply that 
a ‘default provision’ becomes applicable. In such cases, the sole disap-
plication of national law sufﬁ ces to solve the case. This way of precluding 
the application of national provisions which are incompatible with EC 
law is the so-called ‘exclusionary effect’. 
In some cases, however, the disapplication of the provisions of na-
tional law does not bring the case to a satisfactory end. In such cases, a 
third step is required, for which two options are available. Firstly, provi-
sions of EC law may be applied instead of the national provisions by way 
of substitution. This may occur, for instance, if a claim is directly based 
on EC law, or if a legal gap is caused by the setting aside. Alternatively, 
the remaining national law - which could still be applied despite the fact 
that other incompatible provisions have been set aside - may be inter-
preted in the light of EC law. If no options are available, state liability may 
be the ﬁ nal option.
3. The legality principle in the national legal order
The principle of legality exists in all Member States of the European 
Union, although the precise contents and scope may differ from country 
11  Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839.
12  Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) [2003] ECR I-8055.
13  Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517.
14  Compare extensively Claes (n 1) 266-278.
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to country.15 The background and goal of the principle, however, is com-
parable in all Member States. The requirement of legality of the adminis-
tration is one of the main elements of the rule of law which governs the 
Rechtsstaat or l’État de droit.16 The main goal of the principle of legality 
is to protect individuals against arbitrary interventions in their rights 
and freedoms by administrative authorities.17 Moreover, the principle is 
closely related to the principle of democracy, since it requires a demo-
cratic basis for such interventions. In the words of Schwarze: 
regardless of the name it is given or the form it takes, the powers 
of the state are limited in every country by law, for the purpose of 
protecting civil liberties. Under the inﬂ uence of the democratic prin-
ciple, Acts of Parliament have become the most signiﬁ cant legal con-
straint on the State’s area of inﬂ uence.18 
In general terms, one may say that all Member States know a princi-
ple which requires that administrative authorities have no powers other 
than those acquired under general applicable rules. Hence, the legality 
principle prevents the government from acting arbitrarily and it promotes 
predictability, stability, legal certainty and equality before the law. 19
This article will concentrate on the principle of legality as it is per-
ceived in the legal systems of Germany, France and the Netherlands. As 
stated above, the relationship between the different branches of govern-
ment differs in these countries. This also has its consequences for the 
status and contents of the legality principle. In German law, the principle 
is known as the principle of Gesetzmäßigkeit, and is codiﬁ ed in Article 
20 para 3 GG: ‘the legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, 
the executive and the judiciary by law and justice’.20 Hence, executive 
power must be exercised in accordance with statute and law. Moreover, 
under Article 1 para 3 GG its exercise is also subject to respect for fun-
damental rights. In France, le principe de légalité21 is not explicitly codi-
15  J Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006).
16  JB Auby and L Cluzel-Métayer, ‘Administrative Law in France’ in RJGH Seerden (ed), 
Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States (In-
tersentia, Antwerpen-Oxford 2007).
17  L Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, Tôme III: La Théorie Générale de l’Etat (Ancienne 
Librairie Fontemoing, Paris 1930).
18  Schwarze (n 15) 230-231.
19  CAJM Kortmann, Constitutioneel Recht (Kluwer, Deventer 2008).
20  Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt und 
die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.
21  Some authors prefer the use of the concept of the principe de juridicité over the principe 
de légalité, because there are more sources of law to which the administration is subordi-
nate than only statutory law; see for example G Dupuis, MJ Guédon and P Chrétien, Droit 
administratif (Sirey, 2007). Nevertheless, legalité is still most commonly used in French 
legal writing.
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ﬁ ed in a particular provision of the Constitution, but is applicable as a 
general principle of law. The same applies to the Netherlands: a general 
provision which codiﬁ es the legaliteitsbeginsel does not exist, but the 
principle is partly codiﬁ ed in Dutch constitutional law. The Constitution 
obliges the legislature to regulate in certain areas, such as social security 
and administrative law (20 (2) and section 107 (2) of the Constitution). 
Moreover, the Constitution explicitly codiﬁ es the legality principle in the 
ﬁ eld of criminal law (section 15, 16 and 89 (2 and 4)) and tax law (section 
104).22 For ﬁ elds that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the 
requirement of a basis in statutory law derives from unwritten constitu-
tional law.23
The legality principle can be divided into different dimensions in 
several ways. This article distinguishes two elements: the precedence of 
statutory law over all secondary sources of law, and the requirement of a 
statutory basis.24 Both elements are present in all three Member States, 
although the extent of discussion in the literature and case law may differ 
from state to state. Both the precedence of statutory law and the require-
ment of a statutory basis are highly relevant for the ‘Costanzo obligation’ 
which derives from the case law of the Court of Justice. This obligation 
leads to two important questions at the national level. Has an adminis-
trative authority the power to set aside rules which conﬂ ict with higher 
rules (such as EC law)? And which rules (such as EC law) can serve as a 
statutory basis for actions by an administrative authority?
4.1. The precedence of statutory law 
The principle of the precedence of statutory law is present in all 
three Member States. According to this principle, acts of parliament have 
priority over ‘lower’ rules, such as regulatory acts adopted by administra-
tive authorities. In this article, a distinction is made between statutory 
law (acts of parliament) and ‘understatutory’ law (such as regulatory acts 
adopted by administrative authorities such as ministers, but also includ-
ing regulations of decentralised entities). This distinction is in line with 
German and Dutch literature, which distinguishes between ‘statutes in 
the formal sense of the word’ and ‘statutes in the material sense of the 
word’. The former concerns acts which have been established in the for-
mal process of lawmaking, which involves the participation of parliament. 
This is as opposed to ‘statute in the material sense of the word’, which is 
22  See in more detail KLH van Mens, Legaliteit en belastingrecht (Kluwer, Deventer 1988). 
23  See also on this topic, although a little outdated, IC Van der Vlies, Het wetsbegrip en 
beginselen van behoorlijke regelgeving (Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1984). 
24  F Ossenbühl, HStR III nr 62 Rn 13; Schulze-Fielitz in Dreier, GG Kommentar 221.
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deﬁ ned as an act of a competent authority which provides general bind-
ing rules. Hence, a statute in the material sense of the word, referred to 
in this article as ‘understatutory’ law, has a broader meaning, including 
not only acts of parliament but also regulations adopted by ministers or 
decentralised authorities. 
The distinction between statutory law and ‘understatutory’ law ﬁ ts 
perfectly well with the German and Dutch situation. The French posi-
tion, however, is rather different. The French administration has a rela-
tively strong stance in relation to the position of the legislature. Articles 
34 and 37 of the French Constitution deﬁ ne the domaine législatif and 
the domaine réglementaire. Article 34 provides a list of matters on which 
Parliament is empowered to legislate in lois. Article 37 provides that all 
matters outside the scope of Article 34 belong exclusively to the pouvoir 
réglementaire (regulatory power) of the executive.25 Hence, the French ex-
ecutive branch has a very strong position, since the power of parliament 
to adopt lois is listed in an exhaustive account, whereas the executive 
is empowered to adopt règlements on all other subjects. In this regard, 
technically the expression ‘understatutory law’ often does not apply in 
France, because of the division of areas in Articles 34 and 37 of the 
French Constitution. Although in the domaine législatif regulatory acts 
which are based on (and subordinate to) the statute concerned are obvi-
ously also adopted, this does not apply to the regulations which are di-
rectly based on Article 37 of the French Constitution. Strictly speaking, 
these are not ‘understatutory’, but rather ‘underconstitutional’. Having 
made this remark, for reasons of convenience the term ‘understatutory’ 
is nevertheless applied in this article. 
In Germany, the precedence of statutory law (Vorrang des Gesetzes 
or Gesetzesvorrang) derives from the fact that both administrative au-
thorities and courts are bound by Gesetz und Recht.26 Gesetz incorporates 
every role of written law, both of a German or of an EC origin.27 Hence, 
both primary and secondary EC law and decisions of the European Court 
of Justice are accepted as being incorporated in the concept of Gesetz 
und Recht.28 The Gesetzesvorrang binds the national administrative au-
thorities to apply every statutory law.29 Every exception to this rule would 
require an explicit statutory basis.30
25  CE 8 August 1919 Labonne (Rec 737); CE 7 February 1936 Jamart (Rec 172).
26  H Schulze-Fielitz in Dreier, GG Kommentar Rn 15/16 221.
27  Jarass/Pieroth GG Kommentar 2007 art 20 Rn 38; Sachs SA 107; BverwGE 74, 241, 
248 ff.
28  On the basis of the treaties of accession in combination with art 23 I GG.
29  F Ossenbühl HStR III nr 62 Rn 4.
30  BVerfGE 25, 216 (228); BVerfGE 30, 292, 332.
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Moreover, the German federal legal system has a clear hierarchy. 
Within the German legal order, three types of law should be distinguished: 
Bundesrecht, Landesrecht and autonomes Recht. The law of the Bund and 
of the Länder are considered to be state law, and have precedence over 
autonomous laws, such as municipal statutes.31 The relation between 
the law of the Bund and the Länder is governed by Article 31 GG: Bun-
desrecht bricht Landesrecht. Within the legal order of either the Bund or 
one of the Länder, a ﬁ xed hierarchical pattern exists. The highest source 
of law is the Constitution, followed by statutory law, and ‘understatutory’ 
laws (such as rechtsverordnungen). 
In the Netherlands, the precedence of statutory law is also regarded 
as an unwritten rule which derives from the legality principle. Although 
literature on the legality principle seems to focus on the requirement of a 
statutory basis (which will be discussed below), the legality principle also 
provides that powers of administrative authorities have to be exercised 
within the boundaries prescribed by higher rules of law. 
In France, the precedence of statutory law over ‘understatutory’ law 
is already embedded in the system of hiérarchie des normes, which is very 
well developed in both French case law and legal writing. Problems of in-
compatibility and legality are often approached from the point of view of 
the hierarchy of norms, and also solved by the application of the hierar-
chy of norms. Moreover, the precedence of statutory law is also identiﬁ ed 
as an important feature of the legality principle by most writers. It is clear 
that it is closely related to the hierarchy. In the words of Chapus: 
la légalité est faite d’un ensemble hiérarchié et complexe de norms 
constitutionnelles, legislatives, jurisprudentielles, réglementaires, 
auxquelles s’ajoutent diverses norms procédant de conventions in-
ternationales.32 
4.2. ‘The Costanzo obligation’ and the precedence of statute law
The principle of the precedence of statutory law automatically leads 
to the question of to what extent national law permits administrative au-
thorities to examine whether rules of statutory law are compatible with 
higher sources of law, such as the Constitution or EC law. With regard 
to EC law, the ECJ unambiguously obliges administrative authorities to 
carry out this examination. But does this lead to tensions in the national 
legal system?
31  F Ossenbühl in HU Erichsen, D Ehlers, P Badura et al, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 
(De Gruyter, Berlin 2006) 189.
32  R Chapus, Droit administratif général - Tome 1 (Montchrestien, Paris 2001).
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Germany
The issue of whether administrative authorities have the competence 
not to apply statutory provisions that in their view are in conﬂ ict with 
higher ranking law is known in German literature as the question of the 
Prüfungs- und Verwerfungskompetenz der Verwaltung.33 Ensuring Gesetz 
und Recht implies on the one hand that the administrative authorities are 
competent to check whether the rules, concerned in a particular case are 
compatible with higher ranking sources of law (and thus have so-called 
Prüfungskompetenz).34 Nevertheless, the consequences that it can draw 
from this check are far more controversial. In other words, the so-called 
Verwerfungskompetenz, which concerns the question of to what extent 
the administration is also empowered to set aside a statute or another 
act which it deems contrary to higher ranking law, is far more debated 
in literature.
The general opinion in German legal writing is that administrative 
authorities are not entitled to set aside national statutory law which is 
deemed contrary to the Constitution, although opinions in the literature 
differ. The only possibility for an administrative authority that is con-
vinced that a provision of statutory law is null and void, or that doubts 
the validity of a provision, is to obtain an order of the next higher ranking 
administrative authority. When the higher ranking administrative au-
thority is of the opinion that the rule concerned is valid, this decision is 
to be followed and hence the norm is to be applied. However, if the higher 
ranking administrative authority shares the doubts about the validity 
of the statutory provision, it can ask the government to request an ab-
stract control of norms by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in accordance 
with Article 93 I GG, or by the Landesverfassungsgericht in the case of 
inconformity with the Landesverfassung. Of course, the authority con-
cerned can also try to persuade the Bundesregierung or Landesregierung 
concerned to start such an action.35 Nevertheless, in the meantime the 
administrative authority is obliged to apply the statutory provisions con-
cerned, unless the statute concerned permits the suspension of the ad-
ministrative procedure if there are severe doubts with regard to the com-
patibility of this statute with the Constitution.36 
An exception to the absence of a Verwerfungskompetenz exists: in 
very rare cases it is accepted that an administrative authority can set 
33  See for example Ehlers in Erichsen, Ehlers Badura  (n 31) 110; H Maurer Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht (Verlag CH Beck, München 2006) 87 ff; W Erbguth Allgemeines Verwal-
tungsrecht (Nomos, Baden Baden 2005) 60.
34  Erbguth (n 33) 60.
35  F Ossenbühl HStR III nr 101 Rn 5; Jarass/Pieroth GG art 20 Rn 36. 
36  Badura in Badura (n 31) 528.
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aside rules which it deems contrary to the constitution. For example, the 
setting aside of national law is accepted in cases in which the application 
of the given provision leads to punishable acts, administrative offences or 
violation of human dignity, because this cannot be required of the public 
servants concerned.37 
Although German administrative authorities generally do not have 
the power to set aside national statutory law, the case law of the Court 
of Justice obliges them to do so in the case of incompatibility with com-
munity law. The obligation of German administrative authorities to apply 
EC law instead of conﬂ icting national law is widely accepted in German 
scholarly writing,38 although it is rightly seen as an ultima ratio for cases 
in which consistent interpretation does not help.39 Nevertheless, it is also 
widely accepted in the literature that it leads to several tensions with the 
principle of precedence of the law. 
The topic of the disapplication of national law by administrative au-
thorities is currently frequently discussed in German legal writing due to 
a recent preliminary question by a German national court with regard to 
a German administrative authority that disapplied a national law which 
it deemed contrary to the freedom of establishment.40 However, this dis-
cussion also existed several decades ago. In 1969 Zuleeg had already ac-
cepted the Verwerfungskompetenz of German administrative authorities 
37  Ehlers (n 33) 110; compare also the general provisions in art 38 II 2 BRRG 56 II 3 BBG. 
Compare also Bverw G DVBl 2005 1455, in which it is stated that the obligation of art 11 I 
SG is limited by the freedom of conscience (art 4 I GG). Besides, in theory, an exception also 
exists that in cases in which the act concerned is evidently contrary to the Constitution, 
or when a judicial procedure is pending on the subject, the administration can be relieved 
of the obligation to apply the law concerned. These exceptions, however, are practically ir-
relevant in practice.
38  I Pernice in H Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar (Siebeck Mohr 2006) 446; R Streinz, ‘Der 
Vollzug des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht durch deutsche Staatsorgane’ in J Isensee 
& P Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts, band VII 1992.
39  C Koenig, ‘Bedürfen die Bundesländer einer institutionalisierten Hilfestellung beim Ver-
waltungsvollzung von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht’ (1997) DVBl 581.
40  Joined cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 (Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes) in which a 
German administrative authority disapplied the German law on pharmacies because it 
deemed it contrary to the freedom of establishment. Advocate General Bot, however, did not 
address in his opinion the question whether the authority was obliged to do so even in cases 
in which the breach of EC law was not very evident. Compare T Diekmann and F Reinhardt, 
‘Die Filialapotheke der DocMorris NV hat wieder geöffnet’ (2007) Wettbewerb in Recht und 
Praxis 407; W Semmroth, ‘DocMorris als Einfalltor für Normverwerfungskompetenz der 
Verwaltung?’ (2006) NVwZ 1378; G Kirchhoff, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit und “Normverwer-
fungsbefugnis” nationaler Behörden im Fall “DocMorris”’ (2007) Zesar 301; R Streinz and C 
Herrmann, ‘Und wieder DocMorris: Das apothenenrechtliche Mehr- und Fremdbesitzverbot 
aus der Perspektive des Gemeinschaftsrechts’ (2006) EuZW 455; C Lafontaine, ‘National 
Law on Pharmacies and its Non-Application by a Member State’s Public Authorities - Doc-
Morris again leading the way to accomplish Freedom of Establishment’ (2006) ZEuS 301.
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with regard to national law that was incompatible with EC law.41 Another 
example of acceptance of this obligation, even before the Costanzo case, 
is Scheuing, who argued in 1985 that the reasons why administrative 
authorities are not entitled to set aside national law which they deem 
incompatible with the constitution are only applicable to this national 
situation. He argues that these arguments cannot be applied when EC 
law is at stake, because neither the Court of Justice nor the BVerfG has 
a monopoly to set aside conﬂ icting German law (as the BVerfG has with 
regard to unconstitutional German law), and the Bundesregierung can-
not appeal to either of these Courts for judicial review of the national law 
concerned.42
Mögele notes that the ‘Costanzo obligation’ exceeds the powers that 
national administrative authorities have to assess the constitutionality 
of national law, because then they are only in very exceptional cases al-
lowed to set aside national legislation.43 He concludes, however, that EC 
law should not be judged according to German standards, all the more 
so because the ‘Costanzo obligation’ does not - in his view - concern a 
problem of collisions within one legal order. Therefore, he accepts that 
the powers of administrative authorities with regard to collisions of na-
tional law and EC law are more extensive than with regard to incompat-
ibility with the Constitution. The problems he foresees do not concern the 
theoretical basis of the obligation, but its application in practice, which 
requires sufﬁ cient knowledge of EC law at the level of the administrative 
authorities. Mögele introduces several possibilities in this regard, par-
ticularly including the possibility to obtain advice in individual cases.
Schmidt-Aßmann distinguishes three different competences within 
the discussion on the power of administrative authorities to ‘set aside’ 
national law: the power to assess whether a provision of national law 
is in conﬂ ict with higher ranking law (Normprüfung), the power to set 
aside this provision in an individual case (Nichtanwendung einer Norm 
im Einzelfalle) and the power to declare the provision unlawful and not 
applicable in general (Normverwerfung in the strict sense). In his view, it 
is clear that on the one hand every authority is entitled - and obliged - to 
check whether a norm is in conformity with higher ranking law. On the 
other, it is also clear that an authority can only have the power to declare 
a provision unlawful and not applicable in general when it has been ex-
plicitly empowered to do so by a statutory provision - which is generally 
41  M Zuleeg, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften im innerstaatlichen Bereich (Carl 
Heymanns Verlag, Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München 1969).
42  DH Scheuing, ‘Rechtsprobleme bei der Durchsetzung des Gemeinschaftsrechts in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ (1985) Europarecht 229.
43  R Mögele, ‘Deutsches und europäisches Verwaltungsrecht - wechselseitige Einwirkun-
gen’ (1993) BayVBl 552.
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not the case. The in-between power to set aside the conﬂ icting provision 
in individual cases is controversial, in his opinion. 
France 
As said above, French legal writing and case law tend to focus on the 
disapplication of règlements more than on the setting aside of statutory 
law. This may be explained by the strong position of the administration 
in the French legal system, as safeguarded by the Constitution. The posi-
tion of the administration, however, can obviously only be so strong at 
the expense of the position of the legislature, as the power to adopt stat-
utes is limited to speciﬁ c subjects. The obligation to set aside national 
regulations in the case of conﬂ ict with a higher ranking norm has been 
a general obligation for administrative authorities under French law for 
a long time.44 The background of this general obligation is that it is con-
trary to public order to allow (let alone oblige) administrative authorities 
to apply illegal provisions of regulations.45 Moreover, the importance of 
this obligation is strengthened by the fact that an administrative act can-
not be annulled by the administrative court with absolute effect when the 
time limit of the recours pour excès de pouvoir has expired. In such cases, 
the only option is the invocation of an exception of illegality, which can 
only lead to the disapplication of the act concerned in the speciﬁ c case, 
without erga omnes effect. This increases the importance of the general 
prohibition to apply illegal acts.
The French hierarchical system thus requires national adminis-
trative authorities to set aside regulations which are incompatible with 
higher ranking sources of law. As will be considered below, this obliga-
tion also applies when the higher ranking source of law is EC law. It is, 
however, important to note that setting aside is not always necessary to 
safeguard the full effect of EC law. The Conseil d’État has accepted that 
administrative authorities are obliged to interpret their powers under 
national law in the light of EC law, for example a directive.46 In a more 
44  CE 14 November 1958 Ponard Rec 554; CE 9 May 2005 no 277280 Publié au recueil 
Lebon. 
45  Compare the words of Odent, as cited by Fouquet in his note under Alitalia, AJDA 1989 
389.
46  CE 8 December 2000 no 204756 Commune de Breil-sur-Roya; see also for example CAA 
Marseille 16 October 2003, Sarl l’Hermitage Request no 99MA02187 and CAA Paris 10 July 
2003, Banque populaire de la region Ouest de Paris Request no 00PA03076, in which lower 
courts interpret le code général des impôts in the light of the sixth directive. See also CE 21 
October 1998 Syndicat national professionnel des médecins du travail no 179771; Europe 
1999 no 49, in which the Conseil d’État goes very far in interpreting a national loi in con-
formity with EC law to avoid having to say that the loi concerned is manifestly incompatible 
with EC law.
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recent decision in which the EIA Directive was not transposed correctly 
in time, the Conseil obliged the administrative authority concerned to 
interpret the existing national provisions in conformity with the goals of 
the directive.47 Consistent interpretation may be a less radical solution to 
soften incompatibility in practice. 
The more severe obligation to set aside provisions of national law 
which are incompatible with EC law has been the subject of several cases 
of the Conseil d’État in the last decade. In Danielou,48 for example, it ruled 
that an arrêté interministériel was illegal because it was based on a law 
which was contrary to a Community regulation. Moreover, in Boisdet the 
Conseil d’État made it clear that this also applies for statutory law: a pro-
vision of a loi which is contrary to EC law cannot be used as a statutory 
basis for regulation by administrative authorities.49 
Apart from these more general statements, the obligation for adminis-
trative authorities to apply EC law and set aside incompatible national law 
has been elaborated further by the Conseil d’État in the important cases 
Vassilikiotis and Association Avenir de la langue française. The general rule 
that an EC Treaty provision can be applied directly instead of a provision 
of a national regulation in the case of conﬂ ict, can - albeit implicitly - be 
derived from Vassilikiotis.50 In this case, a Greek started an action for excès 
de pouvoir because an arrêté on diplomas which give right to the issuing of 
an ofﬁ cial museum guide card did not include any foreign diplomas. The 
Conseil d’État annulled the arrêté because it is contrary to EC law, more 
precisely to the free movement of workers and to a directive on the mutual 
recognition of diplomas. Nevertheless, this annulment as such is no solu-
tion, because it still does not provide a non-discriminatory rule for foreign 
workers, and hence creates a legal vacuum.
Because this consequence is undesirable, and since the existing dis-
crimination which is incompatible with EC law has to be solved, the Con-
seil d’État discussed the consequences of the annulment in more detail. 
In the ﬁ rst place, the administrative authorities are obliged to adopt, 
within a reasonable time, rules which are compatible with EC law on the 
attribution of professional cards. In the meantime, however, they are pro-
hibited to apply the incompatible décret. Hence, the Conseil d’État obliges 
the administration to deliver a card to EU citizens which apply for it. The 
authorities should examine these requests case by case in the light of the 
directive. Although the background of this obligation is clear - to avoid 
47  CE 6 June 2007 no 292386 Assoc Le Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire; Europe 2007 no 287.
48  CE 11 December 1987 Danielou Rec 409.
49  24 September 1990 Boisdet Rec 251.
50  CE 29 June 2001 Vassilikiotis no 213229, Europe 2001 no 265, RFDA 2001 980. 
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several actions whereby several individuals affected by individual deci-
sions seek annulment of the same arrêté - it is remarkable that the Con-
seil d’État formulates this clear obligation to disapply national law as an 
interim measure, without a request for interim measures by the party.
The Conseil d’État conﬁ rmed the obligation to set aside national law 
which is incompatible with EC law very explicitly and extensively in 2003 
in Association Avenir de la langue française, including the accompanying 
limits of the obligation.51 This case concerned Article 2 of the loi Toubon, 
which stated that the method of use of a product should be reproduced 
in the French language. Contrary to this provision, the minister of cul-
ture and communication, the state secretary of ﬁ nance and the state 
secretary for the economy had issued a circulaire, which stated that this 
provision was no obstacle to the possible use of other methods, such as 
pictograms, in combination with a foreign language.
The Association Avenir de la langue française had brought an action 
against the circulaire, which permitted the use of languages other than 
French, contrary to the law concerned. The ministers stated that the cir-
culaire aimed to bring the provisions of the loi into conformity with Article 
28 EC and the accompanying case law of the ECJ. 
Before going into the case at hand, the Conseil d’État considered in 
very general terms that administrative authorities were obliged to inter-
pret the provisions of national statutory law in the light of EC law. If this 
were not possible, the minister concerned should instruct its services not 
to apply the respective national rule. 
Afterwards, the Conseil considered that the circulaire was not limited 
to an interpretation of the loi concerned. The ministers did not instruct 
their services not to apply Article 2 of the law because of incompatibility 
with EC law. Instead, they adopted a new rule by means of the circulaire. 
Because they did not have the power to adopt this circulaire, the attacked 
provisions of the circulaire had to be annulled because of a lack of com-
petence. 
This case clariﬁ es several aspects, as it is drafted in a very clear and 
general way, providing a vademecum for administrative authorities with 
regard to the effects of the primacy of EC law.52 In the ﬁ rst place, it is 
clear that administrative authorities are allowed to instruct their services 
not to apply a law which is incompatible with EC law.  
51  CE 30 July 2003 Rec no 245076, AJDA 2003, 2156 case note JM Pontier, Droit Admin-
istratif November 2003 no 219 note M Lombard, Europe February 2004 note P Cassia and 
E Saulnier.
52  D Ritleng, ‘Jurisprudence administrative française intéressant le droit communautaire’ 
(2004) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 338.
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However, in casu, they are not entitled to provide a circulaire with 
precise positive instructions on what to do, since they lack this compe-
tence under national law. In other words, the primacy of EC law does not 
give the administrative authorities the power to take over the tasks which 
belong to the legislator in this regard.53 
The Netherlands
The power of administrative authorities to set aside provisions which 
are incompatible with higher sources of law has never been the subject 
of debate in the Netherlands. This might be explained by the character of 
the Dutch constitutional system, which is not only monistic in the sense 
that international law is incorporated in the national legal order, but also 
in the sense that it is accepted as self-evident that national statutes can 
be set aside in the case of conﬂ ict with international treaties. Some years 
ago, the interdepartmental commission on European Law (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ICER), in which public servants with a legal background of 
different ministries take part, adopted advice on the application of EC 
directives by decentralised administrative authorities. In this advice, the 
question as to whether the administrative authority concerned is compe-
tent to set aside provisions of national law which it deems incompatible 
with EC law is not discussed at all: this competence is assumed on the 
basis of the case law of the European Court of Justice.54 Since both the 
Council of State and the minister of Justice have endorsed this view, it 
can be regarded as the general opinion in Dutch constitutional law (all 
the more so because no constitutional court exists, which increases the 
importance of such statements for the constitutional doctrine). The advice 
particularly focuses on the question of how decentralised administrative 
authorities can comply with this obligation. The ICER has a preference 
for consistent interpretation of the provision of national law, if possible. 
Otherwise, when an authority observes an incompatibility between a pro-
vision of national law and a provision of an EC directive, it has to assess 
whether or not the latter has direct effect. To prevent diversity of opinions 
in this regard, the ICER advises that contact be made with the ministry 
responsible for implementation, or the Kenniscentrum in this regard. If 
the directive provision lacks direct effect, it should only be applied if it is 
directly addressed to the decentralised authority concerned. If the pro-
vision is directly effective, the decentralised administrative authorities 
should apply it if it is beneﬁ cial for the private party concerned. If the 
53  Ritleng (n 52) 338. This limit also applies to the ECHR; see CE 22 October 2003 GISTI et 
ligue des droit de l’Homme Rec no 248237.
54  Interdepartementale Commissie Europees Recht,  advies ‘Toepassing EG-richtlijnen door 
decentrale overheden; ICER-advies en werkgroeprapport’ [2003]  2-3.
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directive provision has negative implications, the conﬂ icting provision of 
national law should be applied.
A problem which has attracted special interest in Dutch legal writing 
and case law is the application of directly effective directive provisions 
in so-called triangular situations. The European Court of Justice estab-
lished in the Wells case an obligation for administrative authorities to 
apply directly effective provisions of directives which are addressed to the 
Member States in cases in which they are invoked by a third party, even 
if this causes negative effects for other individuals: 
Consequently, an individual may not rely on a directive against 
a Member State where it is a matter of a State obligation directly 
linked to the performance of another obligation falling, pursuant to 
that directive, on a third party. On the other hand, mere adverse re-
percussions on the rights of third parties, even if the repercussions 
are certain, do not justify preventing an individual from invoking the 
provisions of a directive against the Member State concerned.55
This rule is accepted and applied by the Dutch administrative au-
thorities and administrative courts; however, it is clear that it can be 
hard to distinguish when negative effects for third parties are allowed 
because they are ‘mere adverse repercussions’. But what if no third party 
opposes the granting of certain permission, even though it is clear that 
certain provisions of a directive have not been correctly transposed? Is 
the administrative authority then obliged - according to Costanzo - to set 
aside the conﬂ icting national law and apply the provisions of its own voli-
tion? Or is it obliged to apply the - incorrect - national law, because of the 
prohibition of inverse vertical effects? Under Dutch administrative law, 
the case law in this respect is rather inconsistent. Whereas the Admin-
istrative Law Division of the Dutch Council of State initially held that an 
administrative authority could only apply a directly effective directive pro-
vision against a private party if a third party has invoked that provision,56 
it changed its case law in 2002, stating that an administrative authority 
is bound to apply such directive provisions against private parties ‘if it 
were possible that another private party would invoke it before a national 
court’.57 However, the Council has recently decided a case in which it 
stated that a national administrative authority was not allowed to invoke 
a provision of the Habitat Directive against a private party, because no 
55  Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723; see also recently joined cases C-152/07 and 
154/07 Arcor, nyr.
56  ABRvS 29 May 2001, JB 2001/179; ABRvS 23 October 2002, AB 2002 417.
57  ABRvS 13 November 2002, AB 2003 26.
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third party had invoked the provision concerned,58 the main reason being 
that a directive cannot impose obligations on private parties and that it 
cannot be invoked against a private party. Therefore, the Administrative 
Law Division deems the ex ofﬁ cio application of a directive in such cases 
to be contrary to the principle of legal certainty. Obviously, this can lead 
to rather strange consequences with regard to the application of EC law 
by national administrative authorities. They are obliged by the Adminis-
trative Law Division to take decisions that are clearly in conﬂ ict with EC 
law, and which will be annulled if they are challenged. 
5.1. The requirement of a statutory basis 
The requirement of a statutory basis as a feature of the legality prin-
ciple is particularly subject to discussion in the Netherlands and Ger-
many. This, obviously, has to do with the fact that both systems know a 
clear hierarchy of norms in which statutory law, adopted by parliament, 
has a very strong position. The topic is less discussed in French writ-
ing and case law, which tends to focus on the precedence of statutory 
law. Most French authors assume that it is a self-evident feature of the 
legality principle that competences of administrative authorities have to 
have a democratic basis.59 Moreover, the lack of discussion in France of 
the requirement of a statutory basis may be explained by the fact that, 
as stated above, regulations are more important in the French legal sys-
tem than statutory law. These règlements still meet the requirement of 
a statutory basis since their adoption is based on Article 37 of the Con-
stitution, but a basis in an ordinary loi is absent. Finally, the position of 
the executive branch is strengthened by so-called ‘hybrid norms’. These 
norms - although adopted by administrative authorities - can acquire the 
status of statute when speciﬁ c requirements are met.60
5.2. Field of application of the requirement of a statutory basis: 
Intervening administration versus service administration
The legality principle in its original form requires that every power of 
government is based on a statutory rule. As has already been observed, 
in French doctrine this criterion is not so much subject to debate, but in 
Dutch legal writing, and particularly in the German doctrine, it is ﬁ ercely 
discussed. 
58  ABRvS 7 December 2005, AB 2006 67 (Boxtel); see also ABRvS 1 February 2006 LJN 
AV0959, from which it can be concluded that Boxtel is settled case law.
59  Chapus (n 32).
60  Dupuis, Guédon and Chrétien (n 21) therefore include this topic in the chapter on laws, 
as ‘texte assimilé à la loi’.
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In both the Netherlands and Germany, the requirement of a statu-
tory basis has developed in a more restrictive way, only requiring a statu-
tory basis for obligations and intervening decisions. This also includes, 
for example, binding prescriptions and de facto obligations.61 An example 
of a binding prescription is a letter by the Chief Inspector of Health to all 
doctors in the Netherlands prohibiting them from prescribing to drug ad-
dicts medicines that fall within the scope of the Opium Act. The power to 
send such a binding prescription requires a statutory basis, according to 
the Dutch High Court (Hoge Raad).62 The same applies to de facto obli-
gations. A well-known example in this respect is the Dutch Fluoridation 
case, in which the municipal waterworks of Amsterdam had added ﬂ uo-
ride to drinking water to prevent dental decay. When a group of inhabit-
ants opposed this de facto obligation to consume ﬂ uoride, the High Court 
decided that this was unlawful, because a statutory basis was lacking.63 
A statutory basis is in particular required in both legal systems for 
unilateral interventions by the government in the rights and freedoms of 
citizens,64 so-called Eingriffsverwaltung or ‘intervening administration’. 
It is unchallenged and undisputed in the literature that such actions 
require a statutory foundation.65 The opposite of Eingriffsverwaltung is 
non-interfering actions by the government, so-called Leistungsverwal-
tung or ‘service administration’, which often concern beneﬁ ts for the pri-
vate party concerned, such as the granting of subsidies or other forms of 
(ﬁ nancial) aid. In both the German and the Dutch legal literature it is still 
under discussion whether the legality principle requires a legal basis for 
this kind of action. The general opinion in Germany tends to accept as a 
compromise that in such cases no basis in statutory law is required, but 
that a basis in delegated legislation is sufﬁ cient.
In the Dutch legal literature, some argue, along the lines of the case 
law of Hoge Raad, that only the obligations that the government imposes 
on citizens require a basis in statutory law, and that so-called Leistungs-
verwaltung does not need a speciﬁ c legal basis. In this respect, the so-
61 See more extensively F Van Ommeren, De verplichting verankerd (dissertation, VU 1999) 
62-106.
62  HR 27 June 1986 NJ 1987 898 (Methadonbrief).
63  HR 22 June 1973 NJ 1973 386.
64  Schwarze (n 15) 212-232.
65  See for references D Jesch, Gesetz und Verwaltung (Tübingen 1961); WJM Voermans, 
Toedeling van bevoegdheid (Oratie Leiden, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, The Hague 2004) 
3; F J van Ommeren, ‘Het legaliteitsbeginsel in het staats- en bestuursrecht: opkomst en 
ondergang van geïmpliceerde bevoegdheden?’ (2002) Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 124; 
LJA Damen and others, Bestuursrecht, deel 1: Systeem, Bevoegdheid, Besluitvorming, Hand-
having (Boom juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2005) 52.
84 Maartje Verhoeven: The ‘Costanzo Obligation’ of National Administrative Authorities...
called ‘consistency principle’ has been introduced in the literature.66 This 
principle is based on the notion that the main goal of legality is that 
the actions of the government are foreseeable and thus predictable. The 
scope of this consistency principle seems to be much wider than the prin-
ciple of legality: it applies to all actions, because the government should 
be consistent in all of its actions. Therefore, it is not necessary to qualify 
the actions of the government as interfering or carrying out administra-
tion. This is an advantage, since a distinction between both forms of 
administration is often difﬁ cult to make. For example, the granting of a 
subsidy often also includes certain conditions that qualify as interference 
in the rights and freedoms of the party concerned. 
5.3. EC law as a statutory basis? It should be clear who is 
competent… 
The obligation of national administrative authorities to apply EC law 
and to set aside incompatible national law in the case of conﬂ ict clearly 
leads to an important question with respect to the formal aspects of the 
legality principle: are national authorities entitled to do so under national 
administrative law? Can EC law directly confer powers upon them? As 
many as 40 years ago Zuleeg accepted that EC law in principle can suf-
ﬁ ce as a statutory basis.67 Due to the development of EC law, and espe-
cially the case law of the Court of Justice, such a general answer might 
need to be put into the current perspective.68 
In the Dutch discussion, the answer to these questions depends on 
whether one adopts a strictly national legality principle (by which pow-
ers must be based on national legislation)69 or whether one argues that 
a basis in EC law also meets the requirements of a written statutory ba-
sis.70 In this respect, a distinction should be made between the different 
instruments of EC law, particularly primary EC law, regulations and di-
rectives. This distinction will be discussed in more detail below. However, 
what can already be said in general is that although some instruments 
of EC law may theoretically be aptly compared to a statutory basis, the 
problem is that they are often not very clear as to which administrative 
66  Van Ommeren (n 61).
67  Zuleeg (n 41) 213.
68  H Rieckhoff, Der Vorbehalt des Gesetzes im Europarecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007). 
Compare also joined Cases C-383/06 to C-385/06 Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan So-
ciale Werkvoorziening, nyr. 
69  For example, DE Comijs, Europese structuurfondsen: uitvoering en handhaving in Neder-
land (Kluwer, Deventer 1998).
70  See on this discussion more extensively JH Jans, R de Lange, S Prechal, RJGM Widder-
shoven, Europeanisation of Public Law, (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2007) 23. 
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authority is competent. This is in line with the principle of national insti-
tutional autonomy, which implies that EC law as a rule is only concerned 
with the Member State as an entity. Therefore, the attribution of powers 
to national administrative authorities by name is very rarely found in EC 
legislation. On the contrary, it is generally up to the Member States to 
decide which administrative authority is empowered to apply and enforce 
a particular regulation or directive; the given EC legislation only refers 
to ‘the competent authorities’. The Member State is obliged to do this, 
regardless of whether the regulation or directive contains an explicit obli-
gation to do so.71 A complicated situation emerges when this is not done 
correctly and in due time by the Member State: are the administrative 
authorities then empowered to apply EC law?
A part of Dutch scholarly writing seems to argue that the legality 
principle always requires an institutional basis in national law.72 There-
fore, the lack of a national law that transposes a directive or makes a reg-
ulation operational in the sense that a national administrative authority 
is assigned by name to exercise a certain power basically seems to render 
the application of the power concerned impossible, because the neces-
sary written statutory basis required by the legality principle is lacking. 
A recent judgment by the Dutch Council of State also seems to support 
this view.73 Due to the lack of a national statute appointing the competent 
authorities to apply the power to grant subsidies on the basis of a regu-
lation, it was unclear whether the Provincial Council or the Provincial 
Executive was competent. Therefore, the Council of State explicitly stated 
that the regulation in this case could not be lawfully applied because 
of the lack of a national statute in which the competent authorities are 
appointed. With regard to non-transposed directives, the ECJ cases of 
Draempaehl74 and Dorsch Consult75 can be referred to as support for the 
view that they cannot be regarded as a sufﬁ cient statutory basis. 
71  See for example Case C-365/93 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-499 and Case C-
186/91 Commission v Belgium [1983] ECR I-851.
72  IC Van der Vlies & RJGM Widdershoven, De betekenissen van de Nederlandse Grondwet 
binnen de Europese rechtsorde, Preadvies / Vereniging voor de vergelijkende studie van het 
recht van België en Nederland (Tjeenk Willink, Deventer 1998) 30; E Steyger, Europees recht 
en het Nederlands bestuursrecht, Preadvies VAR (Samsom Tjeenk Willink, Alphen aan den 
Rijn 1996) 28.
73  ABRvS 19 April 2006, LJN: AW2275, AB 2006/296.
74  Case C-180/95 Draehmpaehl [1997] ECR I-2195.
75  Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961.
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5.4. … and it also depends on the instrument of the EC law 
concerned
Apart from the fact that it should be clear who is competent, the an-
swer whether EC law can function as a direct statutory basis for actions 
by national administrative authorities depends on the instrument of EC 
law concerned. In this regard, one has to distinguish between the differ-
ent sources of EC law. Recently, this has been thoroughly investigated 
with regard to German law by Henning Rieckhoff, who examines both the 
EC treaty and the different instruments of secondary law in the light of 
the German legality principle (Gesetzesvorbehalt).76 
The EC Treaty 
The EC Treaty will in practice only rarely be the basis for acts of the 
administration, whereas it is elaborated in secondary EC law in most cas-
es. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that directly effective provisions 
of the EC Treaty can be equated to a statutory basis under national law. 
For example, it is in principle also accepted in case law that primary EC 
law can be the basis of a Verwaltungsakt, as seen in the case where the 
Bundeskartellamt required German airway companies to disclose their 
tariffs.77 
The regulation
The instrument of the regulation does not seem to cause any par-
ticular problems with regard to the Gesetzesvorbehalt, since Zuleeg had 
already accepted in 1969 that it can be equated to statutory law.78 Rieck-
hoff adds that also nowadays it is not so problematic to see a regulation 
as a statutory basis for administrative action in the sense of the Gesetz-
esvorbehalt, especially because of its direct applicability on the basis of 
Article 249 EC. This makes the regulation an instrument which can both 
oblige and authorise all legal entities in all Member States equally.79 The 
example of the Banana regulation, on the basis of which the Bundesrat 
für Ernährung und Forstrwirtschaft prohibited the import of bananas that 
lacked the required certiﬁ cates, shows that the regulation functions in 
practice as a statutory basis for administrative actions as well. This is 
also clear from Dutch case law, in which the College van Beroep voor 
het Bedrijfsleven (one of the supreme administrative courts) accepted the 
76  Rieckhoff (n 68).
77  See Rieckhoff (n 68) 199 for further references.
78  Zuleeg (n 41) 213.
79  Rieckhoff (n 68) 200.
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regulation as a statutory basis for actions by administrative authorities.80 
One has to bear in mind, however, that it has to be clear which admin-
istrative authority is competent to apply the regulation. This may cause 
problems in practice (see above para 5.3).
The directive 
With regard to directly effective provisions of directives, which have 
not been transposed into national law correctly, the situation is more 
complicated, due to the fact that directives are addressed to the Member 
States. With regard to actions of the administration with a positive ef-
fect for private parties, no problem exists, because private parties can 
rely on directly effective provisions towards the state. Rieckhoff, however, 
rightly states that it is obvious that directives cannot impose obligations 
on citizens. His arguments for this conclusion are twofold. Firstly, the 
characteristics of the directive as described in Article 249 EC imply that 
contrary to the regulation, directives are not directly applicable, but ad-
dressed to the Member States. Secondly, Rieckhoff argues that no obliga-
tion exists to publish directives, which makes them hardly accessible for 
private parties. Although this latter argument no longer applies, since 
the obligation to publish has been introduced in the Maastricht Treaty 
in Article 254 EC as a general requirement for the coming into force of 
directives,81 the ﬁ rst argument makes sense. When a directive can be ap-
plied within the scope of the power of an administrative authority which 
already exists under national law, no problems exist, provided the prohi-
bition of inverse direct effect of directive provisions is respected. When, 
however, no power exists, the national administrative authority cannot 
derive power directly from a directive provision, because of the prohibi-
tion of inverse direct effect.82 This problem for example occurred when the 
nitrate directive was not implemented in time in the Netherlands,83 and 
no administrative power existed in which it could be ﬁ tted in.
80  See CBB 18 February 2009 LJN: BH4548; CBB 18 February 2009 LJN: BH4551; CBB 
18 February 2009 LJN: BH4554; CBB 25 February 2009 LJN: BH4690; CBB 25 February 
2009 LJN: BH4694; CBB 25 February 2009 LJN: BH4697.
81  Only directives that are not addressed to all Member States and have not been adopted 
under the procedure of art 251 EC are excluded from this obligation. See also C Trüe, Aus-
wirkungen der Bundesstaatlichkeit Deutschlands auf die Umsetzung von EG-Richtlinien 
und ihren Vollzug (1996) EuR  183, who argues that this introduction is sufﬁ cient answer 
to this often used argument against the direct effect of directive provisions (as argued by N 
Weber, Die Richtlinie im EWG-Vertrag (Gerold und Appel, Hamburg 1974) 108).
82  Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969.
83  The Netherlands was condemned for this in Case C-322/00 Commission v the Nether-
lands [2003] ECR I-11267. 
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The decision
The decision is the third legally binding instrument introduced in 
Article 249 EC. Although the directive has gained more attention in legal 
writing thus far, the possibility of direct effect of decisions was already 
acknowledged by the Court in the Grad case, almost 40 years ago. 
The question whether a decision can be equated to a statutory basis 
depends in my view largely on the character of the decision concerned. 
It is generally accepted that a distinction can be drawn between on the 
one hand decisions that affect the legal position of private parties directly 
(being addressees of the decision concerned), and decisions that do so in-
directly on the other hand (in cases in which the decision is addressed to 
a Member State). It is clear that the former group of decisions can impose 
obligations upon private parties, even without the intervention of national 
administrative authorities. With regard to the second group of decisions 
addressed to the Member States but which do impose obligations on pri-
vate parties indirectly, Rieckhoff does not make any further distinctions, 
but merely argues that the view of German scholars differs as to whether 
this sort of decision can be qualiﬁ ed as a statutory basis for actions by 
administrative authorities.84 In my opinion, this can be brought a bit 
more into perspective. I think a distinction should be made between, on 
the one hand, decisions that involve rules of a general nature, which have 
to be implemented in national law by the addressed Member State, and, 
on the other hand, decisions that are indirectly, by the intervention of the 
Member State as addressee, directed at one or more speciﬁ ed parties. The 
best-known and often used examples of the latter are the decisions that 
oblige the Member State to reclaim the unlawful state aid of companies 
that are named in the decision. 
The nature of decisions of a general character addressed to Member 
States seems to be close to the character of a directive.85 In the recent 
CARP case, this has been conﬁ rmed: the Court prohibited the horizontal 
direct effect of a decision, addressed to the Member States, specifying 
the procedures for attesting the conformity of doors, windows, shutters, 
blinds, gates and related building hardware which had not been imple-
mented in national law. In my view, this again can be related to the case 
law on the prohibition of the horizontal direct effect of directives, although 
until now the Court has never explicitly mentioned this relation.86
84  Rieckhoff (n 68) 208-209.
85  Compare Case 30/75 Spa Unil [1975] ECR 1419 in which the inverse direct effect of such 
decisions was denied.
86  M Nettesheim even explicitly says in general that the case law on the direct effect of 
directives can be applied on the instrument of the decision as well: M Nettesheim in E Gra-
bitz, M  Hilf, M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, (Kommentar, Beck, 
München 2001) art 249 Rn 203.
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It is particularly questionable whether the last group of decisions, 
addressed to the Member State but nevertheless explicitly involving nega-
tive implications for a private party, can function as a statutory basis. 
This question is answered both positively and negatively in German lit-
erature, whereas, interestingly enough, both answers are based on the 
case law of the Court of Justice. 
Some German authors accept state-addressed decisions which in-
clude negative effects for explicitly mentioned private parties as a statu-
tory basis.87 They mainly do so because such decisions generally do not 
provide any discretionary space for the authority concerned for imple-
mentation in national law. Therefore, in their view, the comparison with 
directives fails; they see the character of decisions rather closer to the 
instrument of the regulation.
On the other hand, others argue that the fact that implementation in 
national law is required is decisive, emphasising that the Member State is 
the addressee of the decision.88 Whereas a decision can only impose ob-
ligations on its addressee, as Article 249 EC states, a decision addressed 
to a Member State cannot directly impose obligations on private parties. 
This view is, again, based on the idea that the state-addressed decision 
is closely related to the directive. While a directive cannot directly impose 
obligations on citizens, the same goes for the state-addressed decision: in 
such cases, the national act in which state aid is reclaimed is the basis of 
the negative implications for individuals. 
6. Concluding observations: prodigy or problem child?
The European Court of Justice has established some clear obliga-
tions for national administrative authorities with regard to situations in 
which provisions of national law are incompatible with EC law. If con-
sistent interpretation in such cases is not possible, the administrative 
authority concerned is obliged to set aside the incompatible provision of 
national law, and apply EC law instead if the disapplication leads to a le-
gal vacuum. This obligation can be explained very well from a theoretical 
87  See for this view, for example, S Kadelbach, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht unter eu-
ropäischen Einﬂ uss (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1998) 231; A Scherzberg, ‘Verordnung - Rich-
tlinie - Entscheidung’ in H Siedentopf (ed), Europäischen Integration und nationalstaatli-
che Verwaltung 17 (Steiner, Stuttgart 1997); A Weber, Rechtsfragen der Durchführung des 
Gemeinschaftsrechts in der Bundesrepublik (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln, Berlin, Bonn, 
München 1987) 19.
88  See for this view, for example, R Greaves ‘The Nature and Binding Effect of Decisions 
under Article 189 EC’ (1996) 21 EL Rev 3 (12); Nettesheim (n 86); H Tuengerthal, Zur Umset-
zung von EG-richtlinien und staatengerichteten EG-Entscheidungen in deutsches Recht (Peter 
Lang, Frankfurt 2003) 233; M Vogt, Die Entscheidung als Handlungsform (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 2005) 171 ff.
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point of view, since the principle of primacy requires the setting aside of 
national law in this regard. Hence, the ‘Costanzo obligation’ works per-
fectly well to safeguard the effectiveness of EC law. 
Although this obligation is fully acceptable from an EC point of view, 
the obligation to set aside national law may nevertheless cause impor-
tant tensions in national constitutional and administrative law. These 
tensions primarily concern the principle of legality. This principle is well 
known and is applied in all three investigated Member States, and can be 
divided into two requirements: the precedence of statutory law, and the 
requirement of a statutory basis. 
The precedence of statutory law provides that statutory law has pri-
ority over ‘understatutory’ law, such as regulations by administrative 
authorities. This, in combination with the fact that Community law is 
regarded as a source of law which is higher than statutory law - although 
subordinate to the Constitution in France and Germany - means that 
‘understatutory’ law has to be in accordance with EC law. Moreover, the 
‘Costanzo obligation’ also establishes that administrative authorities are 
obliged to set aside statutory law which is incompatible with EC law. 
This leads to the question about whether administrative authorities are 
allowed to assess whether statutory law is in accordance with the provi-
sions of EC law, and, if not, whether they are empowered to set aside the 
incompatible provisions of national law.
This question is answered very differently in the Member States. The 
three legal systems considered here organise power differently, and thus 
the relationship between different branches of government differs. There-
fore, both the problems that national administrations encounter, and, 
likewise, the solutions to those problems under domestic constitutional 
law, differ. 
In Germany, the question as to whether administrative authorities 
are entitled to disapply a statutory norm which they deem contrary to 
the constitution is a recurring subject of discussion, on which the gen-
eral opinion seems to be that this power does not exist. With regard to 
Community law, however, it is accepted in German legal writing that 
administrative authorities can be obliged to set aside incompatible pro-
visions of statutory law. In France, the instrument of the statute is less 
important than in Germany and the Netherlands, as rule-making is often 
done through the adoption of ‘understatutory’ norms. The setting aside 
of statutory provisions which conﬂ ict with a provision of the EC Treaty, 
however, has explicitly been accepted by the Conseil d’État. In the Neth-
erlands, the power to set aside rules which are incompatible with higher 
ranking rules - such as statutory provisions which are incompatible with 
EC law - has never been a real issue of discussion in the doctrine. This 
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power is assumed, for EC law as well as for national sources of law, as 
deriving from the legality principle and the hierarchy of norms.
The requirement of a statutory basis implies that actions by admin-
istrative authorities have to be based on a statutory basis, thus securing 
the principle of democracy and preventing citizens from suffering arbi-
trariness. The application of this requirement has been the subject of 
discussion in the literature, particularly in Germany and - to a lesser 
extent - in the Netherlands. It is commonly agreed that a statutory basis 
is anyway required when the action of the administrative authority inter-
venes in the rights and freedoms of an individual. With regard to service 
administration, which concerns beneﬁ cial decisions with regard to, for 
example, subsidies and (ﬁ nancial) aid, the applicability of the require-
ment is more controversial. 
After having deﬁ ned the ﬁ eld of application of the requirement of a 
statutory basis, it is important to examine whether EC law sufﬁ ces in this 
regard. Due to the character of the different instruments, one may gener-
ally say that provisions in regulations or in the EC Treaty are more easily 
accepted as a statutory basis than directive provisions or decisions; in 
practice, regulations in particular may function as a direct legal basis. 
However, it has to be clear which administrative authority is competent. 
If this is not explicitly settled in the regulation - which is often the case as 
the EC generally respects the principle of national institutional autonomy 
- the principle of legality requires this to be arranged at the national level, 
before the regulation can be executed. 
To conclude, one may say that the obligations that national admin-
istrative authorities have when national law is incompatible with EC law 
can lead to important questions, which have not yet been answered ad-
equately. Although the basis of the obligation to set aside incompatible 
provisions of national law is clear and defensible, it is a complicated ob-
ligation in practice. In this regard, the lack of some sort of ‘preliminary 
procedure’, as it exists for national courts, may hinder administrative 
authorities in their decisions in individual cases about whether a conﬂ ict 
between EC law and national law exists, whether the provision of EC law 
concerned has direct effect, etc. Hence, administrative authorities have 
to decide on their own volition whether a national provision should be 
set aside. Does this imply, as some argue, that the obligation of national 
administrative authorities to set aside national law which is incompatible 
with EC law should be restricted to cases where the conﬂ ict is clear and 
obvious, or in which a court - either the ECJ or a national court - has 
ruled that an incompatibility exists? It is clear that from a theoretical 
perspective such a limitation would not be welcomed, as it would allow 
administrative authorities to apply the law wrongfully if no judgment ex-
ists on the incompatibility of provisions of national law with EC law. In 
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my view, however, this limitation of the ‘Costanzo obligation’ might be 
a solution for the practical problems which administrative authorities 
encounter. Moreover, it also has theoretical advantages, as a limitation 
of the ‘Costanzo obligation’ promotes legal certainty, as administrative 
authorities are only obliged to set aside national law in cases where they 
are certain that a collision exists and Community law should prevail.
Every coin has its reverse side. The ‘Costanzo obligation’ is a prodigy 
from the Community perspective, since it safeguards the effectiveness of 
Community law, obliging national administrative authorities to grant it 
priority over incompatible provisions of national law. At the same time, 
however, from a national law perspective, the obligation may be a prob-
lem child for national administrative authorities.  
